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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Code of Criminal Procedure,' a conviction could be had upon the
uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice alone. But the courts
would instruct the jury to weigh strictly the uncorroborated testimony
of the accomplice. 2  The subsequent enactment of the Statutes did
not establish any exclusive test for the admissibility of evidence which
tends to corroborate the evidence of the accomplice. Therefore, there
may be no conviction unless the accomplice's testimony is corroborated
by independent evidence which connects the defendant with the crime
charged.4 The court in a four-to-three decision held that the evidence
in this case was insufficient to convict the defendant. There was
nothing, said the majority, that identified the defendant as a partici-
pant in the crime. The evidence of the non-accomplice witnesses was
also inadmissible to support the credibility of Reles since "it was
on merely slight, remote or conjectural significance" and tended to
surprise and prejudice the defendant. 5 The dissent by Judge Lewis
contended that the non-accomplice testimony did not prejudice the
rights of the defendant since it served to "confirm and give credence
to the narrative."
J. A. S.
CRIMINAL LAW - PARDON - SECOND OFFENDER - EFFECT OF
PARDON BY ExEcUTIvE.-Relator was convicted of attempted robbery
in the third degree upon his plea of guilty. The District Attorney
of the county filed an information:' accusing relator of having been
convicted previously in a federal court of robbing a member bank of
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Relator acknowledges
his former conviction and was sentenced as a second offender.2 Al-
though the records establish his conviction in the federal court, it
also appears from official records that two years after his conviction
3CoD Calm. PRoc. § 399 L. 1881, c. 442, as amd. L. 1882, c. 3.
"A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice, unless
he be corroborated by such other evidence as tends to connect the defendant
with the commission of the crime."
2 People v. Dixon, 231 N. Y. 111, 131 N. E. 752 (1921); Lindsay v.
People, 63 N. Y. 143 (1875).
3 See note 1, supra.
'People v. Kress, 284 N. Y. 452, 31 N. E. (2d) 898 (1940); People v.
Maione, 284 N. Y. 423, 31 N. E. (2d) 759 (1940) ; People v. Feolo, 284 N. Y.
381, 31 N. E. (2d) 496 (1940).
A charge to the jury that if they believe "the testimony of the witness
Reles [accomplice] they cannot convict on his testimony unless it is corroborated
by other independent, believable evidence tending to connect the defendant with
the commission of the crime," was held to be a proper charge. People v. Gold-
stein, 285 N. Y. 376, 34 N. E. (2d) 362 (1941).
5 People v. Harris, 209 N. Y. 70, 102 N. E. 546 (1913).
IN. Y. PENAL LAW § 1943.
2 N. Y. PENAL LAW § 1941.
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RECENT DECISIONS
he received a "full and unconditional pardon" from the President of
the United States. The pardon contains a preamble, "Whereas it
has been made to appear to me that the said Martin Prisament is
innocent of the offense for which he is now being held." Relator, by
writ of habeas corpus, has challenged the power of the court to im-
pose upon him a sentence as a second offender, since it appears that,
after conviction of the first offense, he has received a complete and
unconditional pardon upon a finding by the President that he is
innocent of that offense.. From an order of Special Term of County
Court dismissing the writ of habeas corpus, relator appeals. Held,
affirmed. The relator was legally sentenced as a second offender.
People ex rel. Prisanent v. Brophy, 287 N. Y. 132, - N. E. -, 38
N. E. (2d) 468 (1941).
A pardon, as the term imports, is an act of grace 3 and mercy 4
proceeding from the Chief Executive of the State 5 or Federal Gov-
ernment 6 which exempts the individual upon whom it is bestowed
from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed.
7
It generally supposes the object guilty.8 If there is no guilt there is
no ground for forgiveness. 9 A party is acquitted on the ground of
innocence; he is pardoned through favor.'0 A pardon relieves the
offender of all unenforced penalties annexed to the conviction," and
usually removes any disqualifications or disabilities which generally
would have followed from the conviction.' 2  However, the effect of
a pardon is prospective and not retrospective.' 3 It does not change
the past nor obliterate the fact that the crime was committed, nor
that the person had been convicted of it,' 4 because, although the legal
effect of a past act can be removed, the act itself can not.' 5 The one
intrusted with the execution of the laws has the power to exempt an
individual from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has
3 Moore v. State, 43 N. J. Law (14 Vroom) 203 (1881) ; Roberts v. State,
30 App. Div. 106, 51 N. Y. Supp. 691 (3d Dep't 1898) State v. Peters, 43
Ohio St. 629, 4 N. E. 81 (1885).
4 United States v. Morris, 10 Wheat 246 (U. S. 1825).
5 Ex parte Campion, 79 Neb. 364, 112 N. W. 585 (1907).
6 United States v. Wilson, 7 Pet. 150 (U. S. 1833).
7 Roberts v. State, 160 N. Y. 217, 54 N. E. 678 (1899).8 United States v. Morris, 10 Wheat. 246 (U. S. 1825).
9 Roberts v. State, 160 N. Y. 217, 54 N. E. 78 (1899).
10 Williston, Does a Pardon Blot Out Guilt? (1915) 28 HAIv. L. REv. 647.
11 Roberts v. State, 160 N. Y. 217, 54 N. E. 678 (1899).
22 Beck v. Finegan, 254 App. Div. 110, 3 N. Y. S. (2d) 1009 (1st Dep't
1938), aff'g, 164 Misc. 334, 298 N. Y. Supp. 675 (1937).
:13n re Spenser, 22 Fed. Cas. 921 (1878) ; Roberts v. State, 160 N. Y. 217,
54 N. E. 678 (1899).
14 People ex rel. Geiselman v. Hunt, 275 N. Y. 612, 11 N. E. (2d) 781
(1937); People v. Carlesi, 154 App. Div. 481, 139 N. Y. Supp. 309 (1st Dep't
1913).
15 People v. McIntyre, 99 Misc. 17, 163 N. Y. Supp. 528 (1917) ; People v.
Price, 53 Hun 185, 6 N. Y. Supp. 833 (1889), aff'd, 119 N. Y. 650, 23 N. E.
1149 (1890).
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committed. 6 This power is conferred upon him by the Constitution
and cannot be limited by statute or decision.17 It does not have the
retroactive effect of determining whether the judgment was errone-
ous.'8 The highest court of the state, in deciding that the legislative
branch could not encroach upon the pardoning power of the Execu-
tive, in the person of either the President or Governor, did not intend
to hold that the Executive could blot out a solemn record of the judi-
cial branch of the Government. 9 Consequently, in the instant case, a
pardon which is granted by the President because he is satisfied that
the convicted person is innocent, has no retroactive effect on the judg-
ment of conviction which has not been set aside nor reversed by the
judicial department. The pardon merely takes away the penalty di-
rectly attaching to the offense. It does not destroy the fact that the
crime was committed nor that the person had been convicted of it.20
Perhaps the legislature should declare by statute that a pardon should
state the reason for which it is granted, and that it should have the
effect of relieving the convicted person from further punishment and
from all other legal consequences of the crime. But it should not
absolve a party from guilt unless the pardon was granted on the
ground of innocence. 21
S.L.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONs-ToRTs-LIABILITY OF CITY FOR
ASSAULT BY EMPLOYEE IN CHARGE OF REPAIRING STREET.-Plain-
tiff drove down a street in Brooklyn in a freshly painted truck. The
street was being repaired by the city and there remained for vehicular
traffic a narrow portion, above which were overhanging branches,
likely to scratch plaintiff's truck. There were no warning notices or
barriers, at the intersections to the street, indicating that there were
any obstructions to be encountered. The defendant, Sisto, in charge
of the group doing the repair work, ordered plaintiff to proceed under
the branches. When plaintiff refused, Sisto attempted to enter the
U8Ez parte Campion, 79 Neb. 364, 112 N. W. 585 (1907); People v.
Larkman, 137 Misc. 446, 244 N. Y. Supp. 431 (1930).
17 Ex parte Garland, 71 U. S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866) ; People ex rel. Page
v. Brophy, 248 App. Div. 309, 289 N. Y. Supp. 362 (4th Dep't 1936), app.
dis 'd, 277 N. Y. 673, 14 N. E. 384 (1938).
18 Roberts v. State, 30 App. Div. 106, 51 N. Y. Supp. 691 (3d Dep't 1898).
19 It re Spenser, 22 Fed. Cas. 921 (1878) ; Roberts v. State, 160 N. Y. 217,
54 N. E. 678 (1899) ; Baldi v. Gilchrist, 204 App. Div. 425, 198 N. Y. Supp. 493(1st Dept 1923); People v. McIntyre, 99 Misc. 17, 19, 163 N. Y. Supp. 528(1917) ; People v. Carlesi, 154 App. Div. 481, 139 N. Y. Supp. 309 (1st Dep't
1913).20 People ex re. Prisament v. Brophy, 287 N. Y. 132, 38 N. E. (2d) 468(1941); People v. McIntyre, 99 Misc. 17, 163 N. Y. Supp. 528 (1917).2 1 Weihofen, The Effect of a Pardon (1939) 88 PENN. L. Rav. 177.
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